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IT’S ALL THE RAGE: POPULAR UPRISINGS 
AND PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Dante B. Gatmaytan† 
 
 
Abstract: Massive peaceful demonstrations ended the authoritarian regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines twenty years ago. The “people power” uprising was 
called a democratic revolution and inspired hopes that it would lead to the consolidation 
of democracy in the Philippines. When popular uprisings were later used to remove or 
threaten other leaders, people power was criticized as an assault on democratic 
institutions and was interpreted as a sign of the political immaturity of Filipinos.  The 
literature on people power is presently marked by disagreement as to whether all popular 
uprisings should be considered part of the people power tradition.  The debate is 
grounded on the belief that people power was a democratic revolution; other uprisings are 
judged on how closely they resemble events surrounding Marcos’ ouster from office.  
This disagreement has become unproductive and has prevented Filipinos from asking 
questions about the causes of these uprisings or the failure of democratic consolidation.  
This Article departs from conventional thought and develops two alternative theories of 
people power in the Philippines.  The first holds that people power is an expression of 
outrage against a particular public official.  The second holds that it is a withdrawal of 
allegiance from the official in favor of another.  Neither view insists that people power is 
or aspires to democratic revolution.  These alternative theories hope to resuscitate the 
study of Philippine democracy.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1986, millions of Filipinos gathered at a major 
thoroughfare in Metro Manila to defy the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos.  
After four days of protest they forced Marcos into exile as he relinquished 
his twenty-one-year hold on power.  In February 2001, millions of Filipinos 
staged another four-day protest that shortened President Joseph Estrada’s 
six-year term of office to a mere thirty-one months.  A few months later, a 
third gathering attended by millions of Filipinos called for the resignation of 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.  After four days of protest, this 
demonstration ended with a violent clash with the police in front of the 
presidential palace.   
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This practice of removing Presidents by popular protest in the 
Philippines is known as “people power.”1  It hovers over the political 
horizon as a reminder to incumbent public officials that election results in 
the Philippines are subject to a subsequent veto by the people and that public 
officials can be recalled through spontaneous popular uprisings.  
People power is regarded as the epicenter of a democracy movement 
that spread outward from Manila, toppling authoritarian governments 
including the Suharto regime of Indonesia in 1998.2  This “democratic 
revolution” is credited with spawning other popular uprisings in South 
Korea, Pakistan, Burma and Eastern Europe,3 and supposedly “unleashed the 
pro-democracy tide that swept . . . the rest of the world.”4 
Over the years, however, people power has lost some of its luster.  
Hailed as a potential agent of Philippine democratization in 1986, it was by 
2001 denounced as a disgrace to democracy.  Once exalted, it is now 
criticized as “mob rule or anarchy or coup.”5   
The relative ease with which people now resort to people power and 
its impact on politics make it an important subject of inquiry for social 
scientists.  Students of law should study its implications for many concepts 
including democratic constitutionalism, rule of law, and even regime 
                                                 
1
  “People power” is the term initially used to describe the four-day non-violent popular 
demonstration that started on February 22, 1986, on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (“EDSA”) in Manila.  
The demonstrations followed a conspicuously fraudulent presidential election and played a decisive part in 
persuading President Ferdinand Marcos to leave the Philippines and live in exile in the United States.  See 
MICHAEL LEIFER, DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN POLITICS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 186 (1995).  EDSA is a 
major road in Metro Manila that served as the setting for this display of opposition to the Marcos regime 
which allowed Corazon Aquino to assume the presidency.  Id. at 91. 
2
  Vincent Boudreau, Diffusing Democracy? People Power in Indonesia and the Philippines, 31 
BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 3 (1999). 
3
  Thomas M. Franck, Seizing the Moment: Creative and Incremental Thinking about Global 
Systemic Opportunity 22 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 601, 623-624 (1990). 
4
  Editorial, People Power II Uprising As Millstone, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 23, 2004, at 
A7.  In Asia, people power is said to have inspired successful democratic revolutions in South Korea, 
Bangladesh, and Nepal, and ineffectual ones in Burma and China.  See Jose Manuel Tesoro & Ricardo 
Saludo, The Legacy of People Power, ASIAWEEK, March 1, 1996.  People power is also said to have struck 
at communist states in the early 1990s in Europe.  Id. at 22.  In November 2003, Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze resigned amid massive protests over election results.  See BBC News UK Edition, Nov. 24, 
2003 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3231534.stm.  In South America, Bolivia’s 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada joined a list of presidents who were forced from office by massive 
protests.  Also in the list are Argentina’s Fernando de la Rua, (December 2001), Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador 
(January 2000), and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (November 2000).  Another Ecuadorian president, Abdalá 
Bucaram, was forced out in 1997.  See Lucien O. Chauvin, People Power Rules in South America, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1021/p06s01-woam.html.   
5
  Seth Mydans, “People Power” and Unintended Consequences, January 7, 2004, INTERNATIONAL 
HERALD TRIBUNE, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/124126.html.  
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change.  Yet, the phenomenon seems scarcely noticed by academics in 
general and legal scholarship in particular.6 
Instead, recent literature on people power has degenerated into a 
squabble over whether subsequent mass uprisings are genuine 
manifestations of the phenomenon.  This unfortunate turn of events is the 
product of a tendency in the literature to compare all uprisings to the events 
surrounding the removal of Marcos.  The 1986 version of people power is 
touted as a “democratic revolution” and has become the standard against 
which subsequent uprisings are measured.  Those that do not meet this 
standard are disparaged as poor facsimiles or perversions of people power.  
This Article attempts to resuscitate the discussion on people power by 
examining recent developments in Philippine politics.  I suggest that we 
disassociate people power from democratic revolutions because Filipinos 
never attempted a fundamental change in political organization or 
government.  It was directed against Marcos alone.  The anti-authoritarian 
theme of Marcos’ removal was incidental to popular outrage over his 
attempt to nullify the results of the 1986 elections, which were believed to 
favor his rival Corazon C. Aquino. 
In place of the “democratic revolution” view, this Article develops 
two alternative accounts of people power in the Philippines.  The first holds 
that people power is an expression of outrage against a particular public 
official, triggered by government action.  The second holds that it is a 
withdrawal of allegiance from the official in favor of another.  Neither of 
these views is burdened by the insistence that people power is or aspires to 
democratic revolution. 
Reorienting the discourse along the lines of these alternatives should 
prevent sterile debates about whether popular uprisings merit the title 
“people power.” This approach examines the nature of people power 
distinctly from attempts to explain the failure of democratic consolidation in 
post-Marcos Philippines. 
The argument proceeds in several stages.  Part II reviews the instances 
of people power in the Philippines that began with the removal of Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1986.  Part III examines the views of social scientists and political 
analysts on people power and provides an overview of the discourse on 
popular uprisings in the Philippines.  Part IV critically reviews one of most 
sustained attempts to pull these various observations together into a theory 
of the nature of people power.  Ultimately rejecting this theory, Part V 
                                                 
6
  See Mark R. Thompson, Whatever Happened to Democratic Revolutions?, 7 DEMOCRATIZATION 
1-20 (2000). 
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develops two alternative approaches to understanding people power.  
Finally, there is occasion for an epilogue: very recent events involving the 
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration present an opportunity to test the 
arguments presented in this Article. 
II. PEOPLE POWER AND ITS PROGENY 
A. Ousting a Dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines in 1965, 
and again in 1969.  Faced with a constitutional bar to a third term, he 
initiated a revision of the Constitution, with a view to shifting to a 
parliamentary form of government.  Marcos declared martial law in 1972, 
ostensibly to respond to threats from communist groups, perpetuating 
himself in power for another fourteen years.7  Under pressure from the 
international community to prove that he continued to have the Filipinos’ 
mandate, Marcos called for a “snap election” to be held on February 7, 
1986.8  The opposition fielded Corazon Aquino, the widow of a former 
Senator who was Marcos’ fiercest critic.9  
Despite the widespread use of fraud, intimidation and terrorism, the 
National Assembly completed its official vote count and proclaimed Marcos 
president for another six years.10  Aquino rejected the official count, 
proclaimed her own victory, and then called for a boycott of institutions and 
services owned by Marcos or his cronies.11 
                                                 
7
  See David A. Rosenberg, Introduction: Creating a “New Society”, in MARCOS AND MARTIAL 
LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES 13-31 (David A. Rosenberg ed. 1979). 
8
  In response to Marcos’ announcement, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 (National 
Law No. 883)which scheduled special national elections on February 7, 1986, for the offices of the 
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.  Several lawyers’ groups filed petitions before the Supreme 
Court to question the constitutionality of the law.  Five of the Justices voted to declare the law 
unconstitutional.  Inasmuch as there were less than the ten votes required to declare the law 
unconstitutional, all the petitions were dismissed.  See Philippine Bar Association v. Commission on 
Elections, 140 SCRA 455-493 (1985).  
9
  Benigno Aquino returned to the Philippines in 1983 after three years to help the opposition 
prepare for the coming congressional elections.  He was assassinated minutes after arriving and being 
placed under police custody.  His death helped galvanized opposition to the Marcos regime.  
10
  This section is based on many accounts of the fall of the Marcos.  See, e.g., LUCY KOMISAR, 
CORAZON AQUINO: THE STORY OF A REVOLUTION 105-123 (1987); RAYMOND BONNER, WALTZING WITH 
A DICTATOR: THE MARCOSES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN POLICY 385-440 (1988); STANLEY 
KARNOW: IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA’S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 411-423 (1989); SANDRA BURTON, 
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE MARCOSES, THE AQUINOS, AND THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1989); STERLING 
SEAGRAVE, THE MARCOS DYNASTY (1990); PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE 
POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 369-393 (2000). 
11
  DAVID WURFEL, FILIPINO POLITICS: DEVELOPMENT AND DECAY 300 (1998). 
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At about the same time, Marcos uncovered a plot by some members 
of the military to stage a coup d’etat by the Reform the Armed Forces 
Movement.  Fearing arrest, the plotters decided to retreat to Camp 
Aguinaldo, the Defense Ministry headquarters.  From there they announced 
their break with the Marcos regime and appealed for protection from the 
people.   
People power began when civic and church leaders asked Filipinos to 
provide a human shield to protect the military renegades from possible 
reprisals from Marcos.12  People power was “the masses of Filipinos who 
flooded the streets and held off Marcos’ tanks,”13 confident that the troops 
would not shoot unarmed civilians and would instead listen to their appeals 
for democracy.  Marcos was forced from office in a unique event that 
succeeded because civil society, the church, and the military coalesced 
against the dictator.14  Thus, a revolt involving 250 disgruntled officers led 
to a mass uprising by civilians who risked their own lives to protect the 
soldiers.15  It was the culmination of a mass movement against the Marcos 
regime already honed by years of protest into a disciplined, organized 
movement.16   
After Marcos was whisked away to Hawaii, Corazon Aquino was 
proclaimed and sworn in as President in defiance of the Constitution.  When 
she took her oath of office she vowed to uphold “the fundamental law” and 
to execute its “just laws.”17  She announced that her government was 
revolutionary—taking power in the name of the people when she abolished 
the National Legislature and replaced most of the members of the Supreme 
                                                 
12
  BRYAN JOHNSON, FOUR DAYS OF COURAGE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE FALL OF MARCOS 76-82 
(1987). 
13
  Janet L. Sawin, A Study of Peaceful Revolution: The Philippines, 1986, 17-WTR FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 181, 195 (1993). 
14
  Id. at 181; see also Kurt Schock, People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement 
Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma, 46 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 355-371 (1999) 
(discussing the broader political context of political opportunities and constraints that allowed for the 
successful removal of Marcos).  
15
  Carl H. Landé, Introduction: Retrospect and Prospect, in REBUILDING A NATION: PHILIPPINE 
CHALLENGES AND AMERICAN POLICY 7, 23 (Carl H. Landé, ed. 1987). 
16
  See MARK R. THOMPSON, The Puzzles of Philippine “People Power”, in DEMOCRATIC 
REVOLUTIONS: ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE 18, 27 (2003); see also William H. Overholt, The Rise and Fall 
of Ferdinand Marcos, 26 ASIAN SURVEY 1137-1163 (1986).  Overholt, suggests, however, that Aquino’s 
people power revolution had less to do with the fall of the Marcos regime than the internal collapse of the 
administration years earlier. 
17
  Joaquin G. Bernas, Who Is the President and by What Law?, in A LIVING CONSTITUTION: THE 
AQUINO PRESIDENCY 2, 3 (2000).  See also Mark Thompson, Off the Endangered List: Philippine 
Democratization in Comparative Perspective, 28 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 179-205 (1996).  Aquino issued 
a proclamation declaring that her government was installed by the direct action of the people in defiance of 
the provisions of the Constitution and that this extraordinary mandate required the complete reorganization 
of the government.  Id., at 187. 
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Court.18  The reorganized Supreme Court recognized the Aquino 
government as de jure,19 later referring to Aquino’s government as a 
“revolutionary government.”20  
B. Repeat Performance 
In the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada was elected President of the 
Philippines with the largest margin of victory in Philippine history.21  His 
presidency, however, was so shaken by scandals and allegations of 
corruption22 that by October 2000, Estrada became the first Philippine 
president to be impeached by Congress.  His trial in the Senate followed 
shortly.23 
On January 16, 2001, Estrada’s supporters in the Senate blocked the 
examination of documents that prosecutors claimed would prove Estrada 
kept millions of dollars in secret bank accounts. Angered by the decision, 
people took to the streets to demand Estrada’s resignation from office.  
Members of the Estrada Cabinet resigned and the military and police brass 
withdrew their support from the President.  Shortly thereafter, President 
Estrada left the Presidential Palace, paving the way for Vice-President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take the Presidential oath.24  
Estrada challenged the legitimacy of the Arroyo government before 
the Supreme Court but lost.  The Court declared Arroyo’s administration de 
                                                 
18
  Joaquin G. Bernas, Two Revolutions and Something Less, in A LIVING CONSTITUTION: THE 
ABBREVIATED ESTRADA PRESIDENCY 13, 14 (2003). 
19
  Lawyer’s League for Better Philippines v. Aquino (G.R. No. 73748, 22 May 1986 [unpublished 
resolution]) (declaring the Aquino administration a de jure government).   
20
  See Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589, 597 (1992).  President Aquino 
subsequently appointed a Constitutional Commission to draft a new charter for the Philippines, which was 
ratified by the Filipino people on February 2, 1987.  See Evardone v. Commission on Elections, 204 SCRA 
464 (1991). 
21
  According to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Estrada garnered 42.1% of the votes 
cast in the May 11, 1998 national elections.  See NATIONAL STATISTICAL COORDINATING BOARD, NSCB 
STATISTICS SERIES NO. 2001-002, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTRY’S ELECTORAL EXERCISES 7 
(2001).  
22
  The allegations against Estrada involved unexplained wealth, cronyism and marital infidelity.  See 
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, INVESTIGATING ESTRADA: MILLIONS, MANSIONS AND 
MISTRESSES (Sheila S. Coronel ed., 2000).  Marcos and Estrada would later share the dubious distinction of 
topping the list of the world’s most corrupt leaders, placing second and tenth respectively in a list prepared 
by Transparency International.  See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2004, press 
release, 25 March 2004, Regional Highlights page 1 of 7, available at 
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/Highlights_from_the_GCR_2004_FINAL.pdf.  
The Philippines is the only country with two leaders in the list.   
23
  For a summary of the events leading to the impeachment of Estrada, see Carl H. Landé, The 
Return of “People Power” in the Philippines, 12:2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 88, 92-94 (2001). 
24
  Id., 95-96.  See also James Putzel, A Muddled Democracy—”People Power” Philippine-Style, 
Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series No. 00-14, November 2001, pp. 5-6. 
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jure, but on grounds different than those they had used to legitimize the 
Aquino administration: 
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and 
EDSA People Power II is clear.  EDSA I involves the exercise 
of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole 
government.  EDSA II is an exercise of people power of 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the 
government for redress of grievances which only affected the 
office of the President.  EDSA I is extra constitutional and the 
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot 
be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra 
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it 
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are 
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political 
question; EDSA II involves legal questions.25 
Not all the Justices were inclined to rhapsodize about the removal of 
Estrada.  Although there were no dissents in the decision, Justice Ynares-
Santiago expressed her discomfort with the impression that the Court was 
sanctioning people power.  Her opinion, excerpts of which are reproduced 
here, is actually an indictment of people power.  She wrote: 
At the outset, I must stress that there is no specific provision in 
the Constitution which sanctions “people power,” of the type 
used at EDSA, as a legitimate means of ousting a public 
official, let alone the President of the Republic.  The framers of 
the Constitution have wisely provided for the mechanisms of 
elections, constitutional amendments, and impeachment as 
valid modes of transferring power from one administration to 
the other.  Thus, in the event the removal of an incumbent 
President or any government official from his office becomes 
necessary, the remedy is to make use of these constitutional 
methods and work within the system.  To disregard these 
constitutionally prescribed processes as nugatory and useless 
instead of making them effectual is to admit that we lack 
constitutional maturity. 
She claimed that the Supreme Court itself was threatened with “mob action” 
if it did not proclaim Arroyo as a de jure President.26  
                                                 
25
  Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 493 (2001).  
26
  353 SCRA 452, 569, 570, Ynares-Santiago concurring. 
8 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
C. Poor People Power 
Months after he was removed from office, Estrada was charged with 
the crime of plunder, an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death 
under Philippine law.27  Estrada’s supporters camped outside the gates of his 
house to prevent his arrest with many vowing they would die defending him.  
Police took Estrada into custody after dispersing hundreds of supporters that 
had gathered outside his home.28 
Estrada’s arrest by hundreds of policemen and his treatment as a 
common criminal won the sympathy of his supporters.  Backed by local 
churches, his supporters, who were mostly from urban poor communities,29 
staged a massive demonstration at the EDSA shrine for several days to 
express support for Estrada, agitating for his return to power.  On May 1, 
2001, egged on by politicians, the crowd marched to the presidential palace 
and had to be dispersed the following day.30  The 50,000 strong crowd 
armed with sticks and stones, Molotov bombs, and crudely made guns was 
beaten back only after a twelve-hour battle with the police.31 
On May 1, 2001, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region 
and then directed the Armed Forces and the police to suppress the rebellion.  
Arroyo lifted the declaration of the state of rebellion a few days later.32  
D. Small-Scale People Power 
Facsimiles of people power continue to dot Philippine politics, but on 
a smaller scale.  Appointees of President Macapagal-Arroyo are being forced 
out of office by protests led by government employee unions.  Vitaliano 
Nañagas was streamlining the Social Security System before he was ousted 
from office.  Secretary Raul Roco of the Department of Education and 
                                                 
27
  Rep. Act No. 7080 (1991), amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993). 
28




  Vicente Rafael, The Cell Phone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in the Contemporary 
Philippines, 15 PUBLIC CULTURE 399, 422-425 (2003). 
30
  Cesar Bacani & Raissa Espinosa-Robles, Mob power, ASIAWEEK, May 11, 2001, at 28-30. 
31
  Amando Doronila, THE FALL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA: THE INSIDE STORY 221 (2001). 
32
  Opposition leaders affected by the arrests challenged the constitutionality of Proclamation 38 but a 
majority of the members of the Supreme Court believed the issue had become moot when President Arroyo 
lifted the declaration a few days later.  See Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757 (May 10, 
2001). 
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Commissioner Raul Bañez of the Bureau of Internal Revenue were likewise 
instituting reforms when the employee unions forced them to resign.33  
In a slightly different case, the Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes 
resigned after he helped put down a one-day mutiny by members of the 
military.34  On June 27, 2003, some 300 soldiers accused Reyes of 
corruption and of using his position to fuel his political ambitions.  The 
soldiers demanded that he and President Arroyo resign in the wake of 
mounting allegations of corruption and misuse of his position.  The 
Secretary resigned saying he wanted to spare the defense department from 
attacks by his detractors.35 
III. THE CONTESTING VIEWS 
A. An Assault on Institutions 
These popular uprisings are emotionally charged experiences.  When 
the dust clears, participants and observers alike try to make sense of the 
event and rarely agree on what they see.  The debates seem centered on the 
similarities and differences between the removal of Presidents Marcos and 
Estrada.   
During the campaign for the 1986 presidential elections, Corazon 
Aquino delivered a speech wherein she said, “My political program is 
simple.  I propose to dismantle the dictatorial edifice Marcos has built.  In its 
place I propose to build for our people a genuine democracy.”36  She 
interpreted the removal of Marcos as a mandate to restore democracy in the 
Philippines.37  Indeed, “redemocratization” was the “overarching principle” 
of Aquino’s government.38  At the very least, the ouster of the Marcos 
dictatorship restored formal democratic institutions including a presidential 
form of government with a bicameral legislature.”39  
                                                 
33
  Gemma B. Bagayaua, Union Power, NEWSBREAK, November 11, 2002, at 23.  According to the 
union, they filed a petition for the removal of Secretary Roco on the grounds of gross negligence, grave 
misconduct, and incompetence.  See Jet Damazo, Union Claims Victory, NEWSBREAK, September 16, 2002, 
at 8. 
34
  Reyes resignation an act of sacrifice, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, August 31, 2003. 
35
  Id. 
36
  Corazon C. Aquino, Tearing Down the Dictatorship, Rebuilding Democracy, Address delivered 
before the joint Rotary Clubs of Metro-Manila at the Manila Hotel, (January 23, 1986).  Reproduced in 
Corazon C. Aquino, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY AND PRAYER: SELECTED SPEECHES OF CORAZON C. 
AQUINO 13-24 (1995). 
37
  See Carolina G. Hernandez, The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization 28 ASIAN 
SURVEY 229-241 (1988). 
38
  Id., at 229. 
39
  See Julio Teehankee, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in ELECTORAL POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST 
& EAST ASIA 149, 161 (Aurel Croissant ed., 2002). 
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Estrada’s removal from office, however, was condemned, particularly by the 
Western media, as an undemocratic and illegal removal of a democratically elected 
leader. The removal was branded as a conspiracy hatched by business and political 
leaders to force Estrada from what should be the exclusive enclave of the elite.40  
Business leaders were allegedly eager to end the Estrada presidency because it was 
pushing the country towards economic ruin.41  Others pointed out that Estrada’s 
removal “was a de facto military coup, with only broad upper- and middle-class 
support”42 led by “the opportunist coalition of church, business elite” and the defection 
of the army brass.43  It was a “soft coup” engineered “to return the old, wealthy political 
and business elite to power”44 and a victory for “mob rule.”45   
Observers claim that Estrada’s ouster showed the weakness of Philippine-style 
democracy and the general weakness of the Philippine state46 and further indicated that 
there was still no democratic consolidation in the Philippines.47  The middle-class, said 
one author, destabilized democracy in the name of “good governance.”48 
Estrada said that his removal “irrevocably damaged the democratic institutions 
that EDSA I restored in the 1986,”49 and that the process of changing duly-elected 
leaders “may depend on the mob and a few fence-sitting and ambitious generals 
breaking the chain of command at a crucial moment.  Future leaders may be removed 
by a noisy minority through rallies and street protests and the withdrawal of support by 
the military.”50 
                                                 
40
  See Peter Cordingley & Antonio Lopez, After the Gloria Euphoria, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 2, 2001, at 
21. 
41
  For a summary of the Philippines’ economic performance under the Estrada Administration see 
Mark L. Clifford, Not a moment too soon, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 5, 2001, at 16-19.  See also Solita C. 
Monsod, Mediocre by Empirical Findings, in PEOPLE POWER 2: LESSONS AND HOPES 207-208 (2001) 
(discussing the deteriorating economic conditions under Estrada’s administration). 
42
  William H. Overholt, It’s ‘People Power’ Again, but this Time Without the People, 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/8430.htm. 
43
  Philip Bowring, Filipino Democracy Needs Stronger Institutions, INTERNATIONAL HERALD 
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B. In Defense of “Folk Democracy” 
Those who instigated or benefited from the removal of Estrada, of 
course, do not share these views.  President Arroyo’s interpretation of her 
mandate was that it was a “new lease in reclaiming our nation’s destiny 
through a new opportunity at governance.”51  The contradiction in her 
statement is palpable—a mandate grounded on good governance should 
manifest fealty towards the rule of law.  Instead, Arroyo’s assumption to 
office disregarded the impeachment proceedings against Estrada and the 
constitutional provisions on presidential succession.   
But the removal of Estrada is often explained as a form of direct 
democracy.  People Power II was an exercise in direct democracy that 
“kicked into motion once representative institutions began to check 
systematic and massive abuse[s] of power.”52  The ouster of Estrada was not 
exclusively an elite enterprise because the anti-Estrada coalition included the 
organized left and organized labor—the lower classes exhibiting barely a 
modicum of support for Estrada.53  According to one political analyst, it was 
a “people’s coup”—a “democratic upheaval, driven by the people in their 
exercise of their sovereign right to remove a leader who has failed them.”54  
Those supporting the removal of Estrada have developed a thesis regarding 
the propriety of their actions: 
…[I]t was a popular movement that corrected the error of 
having elected Estrada as President on a populist platform.  In 
People Power II, the people acted to halt the devastation 
inflicted by the Estrada presidency, through its incompetence 
and venalities, on the economy, the political institutions and the 
presidency, which suffered its worst degradation during the 
Estrada administration.55 
According to this thesis, the demonstrations that forced Estrada from office 
were “an eloquent protest against the country’s fractured institutions, and 
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forcefully asserted popular anger over the blatant corruption of democratic 
principles and processes.”56   
Former President Fidel V. Ramos claims that people power “is an 
assertion of the sovereign people’s ultimate right to intervene—when 
political institutions fail—to undertake a last effort to make democracy work 
the way it should.”57  It is an attempt to restore an “invisible institution of 
morality” which he claims is the “true foundation of the rule of law.”58 
Ramos opines that Philippine-style democracy entitles the people to 
use both direct (extralegal means) and indirect (legal) forms of exercising 
popular sovereignty so that when the indirect mechanisms do not function 
properly, recourse to direct mechanisms like people power are necessary.  
EDSA II, in this view, was the only viable alternative left after what a 
critical mass of people thought to be a premature end of the impeachment 
trial of then-President Estrada.  According to this view, EDSA II embodied 
the collective will and action of a critical mass that ultimately ousted a 
leader charged with cronyism and corruption.59  Estrada’s removal from 
office was a “large-scale collective action in the wake of a failed formal 
mechanism (the impeachment process) [which] turned public opinion, 
forcing a mass resignation of the cabinet and the effective resignation of the 
president.”60  This view concludes that People Power II did not weaken 
Philippine democracy but strengthened it, giving Filipinos an opportunity to 
reform their government and work for the common good.  EDSA II was 
another “chance to reform [Philippine] ‘electoral democracy’ and seriously 
bring about ‘substantive democracy.’”61 
C. An Attempted Putsch? 
The debate about Estrada’s removal was compounded when his 
supporters gathered at EDSA to call for his return to the presidency.  This 
event, EDSA III, remains largely ignored by analysts and in many cases, 
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available accounts are limited to descriptions of violence, fueling the view 
that it was a mob that gathered in support of Estrada.62  When EDSA III is 
mentioned at all, it is disparaged as “the attack on Malacañang palace . . . by 
mobs incited by political allies of deposed President Estrada . . . .”63  It was 
“a prolonged rally” that “ended in a bloody, riotous attack on the presidential 
palace.”64  
These accounts make no distinction between the nonviolent protests at 
the EDSA shrine and the subsequent attack on the presidential palace.  This 
omission is significant because only a small fraction of those who were at 
EDSA actually marched to Malacañang Palace.  As such, the accounts of 
this uprising are hostile, and distinguished from the accounts of the prior 
uprisings involving the removal of Presidents Marcos and Estrada. The 
following excerpts are characteristic of this treatment: 
It is important to distinguish the May 1 street protest from the 
two previous “People Power” upheavals.  The appropriation of 
“People Power” by Estrada’s supporters was a malevolent 
attempt to convey the impression that they were carrying out a 
genuine people’s revolt against a usurper, in this case President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  But this crowd had a frenzied 
quality, with enraged mobsters charging the beleaguered police, 
and cabal plotters inciting the crowd to violence. . .  
. . . .  
  The most disturbing aspect were reports that many 
protesters were paid up to 1,000 pesos ($20) a day to lay siege 
to Malacanang.  They were rounded up from impoverished 
squatter communities by mayors sympathetic to Estrada. A 
thousand pesos can feed a poor family for a week.  It is no 
different from the routine vote-buying during election 
campaigns. . . . 65 
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In short, the mainly middle-class forces behind EDSA II refused to 
include the “May Day Riots” in the people power tradition, claiming that it 
lacked moral clarity, and that it was violent and largely orchestrated by pro-
Estrada forces carting people from the provinces or inducing them to 
participate with money, food and even drugs.66  
Most accounts patronize the participants as the pawns of vested 
interests or “mainly motivated by resentments against the rich, by feelings 
that a terrible injustice had been done to their hero…by a sense that they 
were acting to protect the constitution and democracy.”67  The third uprising 
at EDSA, said one political scientist, was a “powerful warning that the 
nation’s poor, once sufficiently empowered, may finally rise against a 
society and political system they judge to be hopelessly unjust and 
oppressive.”68  
All of a sudden, people were having second thoughts about the 
wisdom of people power.  The removal of Joseph Estrada and the storming 
of the presidential residence by pro-Estrada groups are leading people to 
think that “not only is people power becoming a habit in making political 
change but also its overuse is dangerous to democracy and political 
stability.”69   
Disagreement over the nature and use of people power is rising; this is 
evident in public opinion surveys.  A survey conducted by the Social 
Weather Stations70 in February 2001 showed that 71% of the respondents 
believed that People Power II was “the sentiment of the majority” compared 
to 28% who believed that it was the sentiment of a few.71  The survey also 
showed that 61% of the respondents expressed the view that Estrada’s 
removal was “just” and 59% went so far as to say that it was the “will of 
God.”72  Another survey conducted by the University of the Philippines 
Center for Leadership, Citizenship and Democracy conducted in November 
2001 showed that 77% of the respondents agreed that the removal of Marcos 
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in 1986 was “true people power.”73  However, only 57% of the respondents 
agreed that the forced resignation of Estrada was “people power,” and only 
30% believed that the pro-Estrada gathering at EDSA was people power.74 
D. Cabinet Resignations 
The latest incarnations of people power in the Philippines were carried 
out to force the resignations of members of the Arroyo cabinet.  This recent 
permutation of people power has even fewer supporters, and it is often 
described as “rule by the rabble,”75 a grotesque form of people power 
unleashed to pressure government institutions such as the Commission on 
Elections (in the case of the disqualification of party-list organizations) and 
the Supreme Court (in the case of its decision over the legitimacy of the 
Arroyo administration).  The removal of members of the Cabinet fuels 
contempt for people power because it allegedly forces public officials to 
abdicate governance to accommodate the demands of interest groups. 76 
The sociologist Randolph David explains, however, that these 
instances are not reasons to regret or fear people power.  In his view, a 
people inspired by the effectiveness of direct collective action as a political 
weapon will now challenge the old routines of stable bureaucracies.77  
Indeed, it is David, more than anyone else, who has demonstrated 
unwavering faith in people power.   
IV. DAVID’S THEORY OF PEOPLE POWER 
Randolph David has made the greatest efforts at defining the 
parameters of people power.  In various pieces throughout the years he has 
presented his ideas on what constitutes a genuine exercise of that power.  
People power, he points out, does not exist in the vocabulary of either social 
theory or political theory—so he presents his own definition: 
In empirical terms, what we have come to call people power is, 
first of all, a large public gathering of unarmed people united 
by a set of common political calls. 
  Secondly, it is a political gathering in the sense that its 
objectives are ultimately concerned with political power, even 
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though it remains largely non-violent and unarmed, and may at 
times even assume a religious form. 
  Thirdly, this massive gathering of people usually in a 
symbolic place is sustained over a couple of days, with the 
crowd growing in size, density and fervor day by day. 
  Fourthly, a variety of activities ranging from speeches, 
singing, dancing, and religious rituals keep the participants 
cheerfully engaged.  These activities are characterized by a 
spontaneous outpouring of warmth and generosity among the 
members of the crowd, creating a social leveling or equalizing 
effect on the participants. 
  Lastly, people power is amorphous; it follows no definite 
timetable, has no definable organization or leadership, and 
follows no predetermined direction.  Its main concern is to 
increase its numbers from day to day.  It knows when it has 
attained its peak; the collective excitement reaches a crescendo, 
and the crowd eagerly awaits its moment of final discharge and 
triumph.78 
Curiously, this definition seems more concerned with form (location and 
size) and fuzzy feelings.  David seems to be crafting a definition that would 
exclude the pro-Estrada rallies from any discussion of people power by 
focusing on a warmth and generosity that the pro-Estrada rallies allegedly 
lacked,  at least insofar as they were depicted by the media. This is not the 
only occasion on which David tried to remove EDSA III from people power 
discourse.  On another, he wrote:  
Real people power is autonomous, self-willed, and well 
informed.  It draws its courage and determination from the 
power of its convictions.  It is inventive and free, and not 
constrained by dogma, political correctness or any party line.  It 
is moral protest elevated to an art.  It is not awed by power.  It 
stands up to power, but it disdains power.  That is why it has no 
leaders, only symbols.  It clothes itself in the symbols of 
everything that is good, decent, and responsible.   
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  It is unarmed, non-violent, and highly disciplined.  It is 
militant but never sad.  Indeed it is festive and celebratory.  It is 
angry at times, but never aggressive.  It does not only claim the 
high moral ground, but it also regards itself as the force of the 
new, the vanguard of a hopeful future.  Oppressive, morally 
bankrupt, and corrupt regimes are its principal targets. 
. . . .  
  The crowds that are mobilized and prompted to sing 
praises for someone already in power do not constitute people 
power.  People power is never sycophantic.  While it fights 
tyrants and corrupt leaders, it studiously avoids being used for 
narrow political ends.  And herein lies its paradoxical strength: 
people power is a political weapon with political ends; yet it 
resolutely rejects political ambition.79 
David also adopts the view that people power compensates for the defects of 
Western political systems that were implanted in the Philippines.  He views 
people power as “a means of correcting the major dysfunctional 
consequences of borrowed institutions.”80  It is a tool “far more effective 
than piecemeal pressure politics and far more powerful than amending a 
constitution.”81  Rather, it is a safety valve that can be released when the 
implanted foreign institutions fail—the back-up system that accommodates 
unanticipated episodes in political life.  As such, EDSA II was the result of a 
movement—consisting of “the young, the middle class, and the educated 
sectors of society who refused to be led any further by an inept, corrupt, and 
archaic President”—to restore accountability and idealism in government.82   
David thus interprets people power as an application of this emergency 
measure.  He gives EDSA II, in particular, a new sheen:  
EDSA II is this generation’s urgent plea to reorganize 
ourselves, update our institutions, develop our human 
resources, and re-dedicate ourselves to our heroes’ dream of an 
independent and confident nation before the imperatives of 
capitalist globalization overtake and drown us.  Today we know 
that this cannot be achieved under a national leadership that 
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governs the nation as if it is business as usual.  It is clear that 
we can no longer afford to drift, because even if we don’t 
drown, we would be swept by the tide to an isolated corner, 
there to wallow in our insecurities and irrelevant resentments.83 
Consistent with this template, David disparages the pro-Estrada 
demonstrations: 
This is not people power; this is its parody, its farcical version.  
People power is moved by hope; the so-called “EDSA III” is 
burdened by despair.  People power imagines what life can be if 
people placed their destiny in their hands.  This one imagines 
what life would have been if their patron had not been 
overthrown.  People power desires to move on and remake the 
world; people resentment desires to dwell in the past and 
display its wounds.84   
There are certain elements, David explains, that should be present before a 
massive gathering can qualify as genuine people power.  To be genuine, it 
must have the sympathy of the larger society (schools, mass media, churches 
professional, and business organizations).85   
David’s views seem skewed to discredit any uprising that deviates 
from the goals laid down by the anti-Estrada groups.  The genuine exercise 
of people power as David defines it should approximate the goals and 
techniques of the uprising that removed Estrada from office. 
Even if one accepts David’s definition, it may yet be argued that the 
Estrada rallies still qualify as people power.  Were the pro-Estrada rallies 
any less festive?  Were they any less charged with hope?  Were they not 
protests against the perceived usurpation of the office of the president?   
In the quest to answer questions regarding the nature of genuine 
people power, we ask the wrong questions when we try to fit the subsequent 
events into the template of the 1986 uprising.  From this view, only the 
removal of Marcos is genuine.  The removal of Estrada is contested.  The 
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attempted removal of President Arroyo is branded as a parody, a farce, and 
even an obscene “bastardized version” of people power.86   
This myopic approach to discussing popular uprisings disables us 
from understanding why they happen at all.  We keep ourselves from 
knowing why the vaunted “people power revolution” of 1986 failed to bring 
genuine democracy to the Philippines.  Instead, the inquiry should be 
reoriented to accommodate alternative views of people power so that the 
definition encompasses all popular uprisings.   
V. TWO MORE VIEWS 
The events that ended the Marcos regime revived the promise of 
democracy and prompted speculation of similar uprisings in other 
authoritarian states.87  These events put the Philippines at the crest of the 
“third wave of democratization”88 and political protests, such as those 
directed at Marcos, are identified as among the significant factors 
contributing to democratization in Asia.89 
Recently, however, the “transition paradigm”—the belief that a 
country’s move away from authoritarian rule is a move toward democracy—
has come under serious scrutiny.  Analysts have pointed out that many 
countries in a “transitional” state are not in transition to democracy and 
claim that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness.90  The political 
trajectories of most third-wave countries bring into question the very core 
assumptions of the transition paradigm.91 
The United Nations Development Programme aired a similar concern. 
There are presently more democratic countries and more political 
participation than ever.  There are 147 countries holding multi-party 
elections, 121 of which had some or all of the elements of formal democracy 
in 2000, an increase from fifty-four countries in 1980.92  Of the eighty-one 
countries that took steps towards democratization, however, only forty-seven 
are considered by the UN to be full democracies, while others do not seem to 
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be in transition to democracy.93  Rather than a wave of democracy, there 
seems to be an unprecedented increase in the rise of “pseudodemocracies”—
regimes that are “neither clearly democratic nor conventionally 
authoritarian.”94 
A. People Power as One Stage in the Process of Democratization 
The removals of Marcos and Estrada excited students of Philippine 
politics with hopes of potential strengthening of democracy and quickening 
of democratization.  Subsequent events, however, have so far disappointed 
those hopes.  The Aquino government made modest changes towards 
democracy and not a “…decisive reform of iniquitous social structures...”95  
Philippine democracy after Marcos remained “shallow and fragile.”96  While 
the ouster of Marcos encouraged civil society to flourish, traditional actors 
in political society have used their positions of power to stifle the 
participation of civil society.97  Moreover, instead of leading to the creation 
of a more democratic system,98 recent surveys indicate that Filipinos are 
dissatisfied with democracy.99 
Much of the frustration over people power is a product of the failed 
hopes that it initially inspired.  Even assuming that both the Marcos and 
Estrada removals were genuine exercises of people power, neither event 
accomplished the social transformation it purported to trigger.100  The 
aftermath of EDSA I was anything but revolutionary.  Rather, it “paved the 
way for the return of the old system of elite democracy that Marcos’ martial 
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law had tried to bury.”101  David explains that because political power 
remained in the hands of the elite, the energy of People Power I “was 
quickly contained and placed at the disposal of conservative forces.”102  The 
rage underpinning EDSA II was extinguished at an even earlier stage.  The 
elite, after its capture of the state apparatus, urged the need for stability of 
the political system and, far from carrying out any mandate of reform, 
simply rebooted the system with a different cast of characters at the 
country’s helm. 
Three years later, the Philippine press declared EDSA II as another 
failure because “[t]he business of government and politics is still being 
conducted, not on the basis of principles, but on the basis of pragmatism, 
practicality and self-interest.”103  The Catholic Church agreed saying that the 
gains of people power had already been squandered,104 as the forces 
responsible for the fall of Estrada drifted apart.105 
The disappointment is inevitable because we exaggerate expectations 
from people power.  If the fall of Marcos is a “democratic uprising”—
defined as a “spontaneous popular uprising . . . which topple[s] unyielding 
dictators and begin[s] a transition process that eventually results in the 
consolidation of democracy”106—then people power can only disappoint.  If 
one regards the fall of Estrada as the result of a crusade against corruption, 
the disappointment is magnified yet again.  
In essence, people power is an expression of outrage against assaults 
on the integrity of the political system.  This was true when Marcos used an 
election to cloak his administration with a veil of legitimacy, and when 
Estrada’s allies in the Senate blocked access to records that would reveal the 
extent of his personal wealth during his impeachment trial.  In both cases, 
the formal institutions of government were abused; resort to an alternative 
was inevitable.  
As an expression of rage, people power has inherent limitations.  First, 
the rage is expended almost as soon as it becomes manifest.  It does not 
purport to lay out a plan for institutional or moral changes in Philippine 
politics and society.  As one journalist who analyzed the removal of Estrada 
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put it, “No one who came to [EDSA] on the night of January 16 had any idea 
what he would do there, except to be with kindred spirits and weep for our 
country and our children.”107  Second, it builds on a consensus for change 
only insofar as the incumbent officials are challenged to resign.  The fiesta is 
directed at the removal of an individual.  In 1986, the Marcos administration 
was replaced by those believed to have won the elections.  In 2001, the vice-
president of the country replaced Estrada.  
Because it is temporary, people power does not claim to initiate 
structural reform.  It is a declaration of outrage that dissipates when the 
immediate issue is addressed.  It gives hope but cannot provide a blueprint 
for reform.  The political processes are, therefore, left vulnerable to 
predation.  People power may be triggered by the ideal of justice, but it 
cannot see beyond its own rage and—it lacks the vision of reform.  
Wandering aimlessly, it is easily hijacked by remnants of the state. 
Although reassembly or control of the state apparatus falls to those 
who succeed in disassembling the state, the overriding concern turns very 
quickly turns to political stability, and thus the players drift towards 
restoration, and not revolution.  Their anger spent, the people realize the 
potential dangers of their actions and instinctively rebuild the system that 
they helped take apart.  It is little wonder then that, after the dismemberment 
of the Marcos political apparatus, the Filipinos built a government 
resembling much of the pre-martial law structures that the dictator himself 
destroyed.108  After Marcos, Filipinos restored the structures of Western 
democracy but could not alter the inequities in society.109  This is also true 
for the removal of Estrada—nothing revolutionary in the government 
structure or personnel emerged after the President was removed. 
People power defies the State insofar as it challenges the incumbent to 
resign.  It carries with it so much potential for social reconstruction that it is 
distrusted and quickly contained by the political and economic elite.  This is 
possibly why, despite ending both the Marcos and Estrada administrations, 
Filipinos lament the reconsolidation of elite power.  People power is not a 
revolution so there is no apparent need to restructure the state to address 
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social ills or make the system more democratic.  It carries so much of the old 
order that it will rebuild itself in the image and likeness of its predecessor.   
This is not to suggest that popular uprisings cannot lead to 
democratization; they do provide a temporary opening that can allow for 
such revolutionary changes.  People power can create an environment for 
policy change only while traces of rage still linger in the air.  Philippine 
sociologist Raul Pertierra classifies both the ousters of Marcos and Estrada 
as instances of comunitas, which is the suspension or reversal of societal 
bonds.110  Under comunitas, social hierarchies are suspended thereby 
providing an opening for radical changes.  Unless this opening is exploited, 
the old structures will escape transformation.111  As explained above, this is 
the reason why conservative forces quickly contain the space for 
revolutionary changes created by people power.   
If people power is a form of democratic revolution, only Marcos’ 
removal will qualify as genuine people power.  The removal of Estrada does 
not even pretend to be about strengthening democracy or making the 
political system more democratic.  It was designed to remove a single 
individual from office.  There was no overhaul of an ailing system; instead it 
invoked the Constitution to justify the assumption of Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to office. 
Nor can the attempted removal of President Arroyo claim any 
semblance to uprisings aimed at furthering democracy because it was 
triggered as a protest against the arrest of Estrada.  Ironically, the trigger for 
EDSA III was actually an attempt on the part of the government to follow 
the rule of law, by arresting an accused to stand trial for the crimes of which 
he was charged.  The number of people who attended the pro-Estrada 
demonstrations cannot change the fact that this gathering at EDSA was 
designed to restore a person to power.  In any case, the violent march to the 
presidential palace instantly disqualifies the pro-Estrada demonstrations 
from the list of “genuine” exercises of people power.  Likewise, every other 
use of people power to remove members of the cabinet will be a farce 
insofar as their purpose is to protest policies and/or personalities.  
In short, the account of people power as a form of democratic uprising 
leads to dissatisfaction with its results, because ultimately the Philippines 
remains in the clutches of “elite democracy.”  This account also precludes 
the possibility of appreciating any other massive uprising as a “genuine” 
people power because the conditions that led to the ouster of Marcos in 1986 
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can never be replicated.  However, if we instead viewed it as less than a 
revolution, we could begin to ask why democracy has not yet consolidated in 
the Philippines so that we could address these issues.  With this perspective, 
we could strive to find an explanation as to why democracy has not been 
consolidated instead of wallowing in its failure. 
B. People Power as a Declaration of Allegiance 
There is another way of viewing the people power phenomenon, one 
that has little to do with democracy or democratization.  On this view, the 
participants of the first people power uprising did not gather at EDSA in 
defiance of an authoritarian regime, but because they were outraged at the 
manner in which Marcos stole an election to further entrench himself in 
power.  The final assault on his hold on power was not a revolt against his 
authoritarian regime; the people power uprising would have occurred even if 
the Philippines had been a democracy at that time.  Rather than a 
“revolution,” the uprising may be described as a shift of allegiance away 
from Marcos or as a popular vote of no-confidence. 
Many of those who opposed the Marcos regime did not hold strong 
beliefs in democratic ideals.112  Some were simply excluded from Marcos’s 
system of crony capitalism or were more concerned with the communist 
insurgency than the restoration of electoral democracy.113  Yet, we associate 
the fall of Marcos with democratization because his regime was in fact 
authoritarian; and more importantly, because it coincided with the fall of 
many other authoritarian regimes throughout the world.  The temptation to 
cluster these events together as the third wave of democratization becomes 
irresistible.   
On the alternative view here considered, an attempt to dislodge an 
incumbent official qualifies as a genuine exercise of people power, 
regardless of whether the attempt is successful or not. People power thus 
described is no less profound.  That a people can band together peacefully to 
force a chief executive from office makes the event astounding.  There is 
nothing intrinsically bad about collective effort to remove a person from 
office.  Officials can be pressured to, and sometimes, do resign.  These 
pressured resignations do not constitute departures from “rule of law” or 
democratic constitutionalism.  Fixed terms of office are not guarantees of 
tenure; they do not guarantee an elected official a minimum number of years 
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in office but they do set a maximum.  That the political atmosphere could 
dictate a shorter tenure for a public official is an unwritten rule of politics. 
The view that people power simultaneously challenges the legitimacy 
of an incumbent and favors another person with allegiance precludes 
questions into whether an attempt at people power is genuine.  Because it is 
a declaration of allegiance, it is neither right nor wrong.  The only inquiry to 
be made is whether the official succumbs to such displays of defiance.  The 
outcome is determined by, among other things, the mettle of the official and 
the magnitude of support for those challenging his or her rule.114   
The removals of Marcos and Estrada fit this description. Marcos’ 
departure was finally guaranteed by the United State’s withdrawal of 
support.  In Estrada’s case, the people—those present at EDSA—declared 
their withdrawal of support for the President.  When most of his cabinet and 
the military also withdrew their support for Estrada, he left the palace and 
then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became President by 
operation of the Constitution. 
In this sense, even the pro-Estrada rallies—until they degenerated into 
an attack on the presidential palace—are also manifestations of people 
power.  They, too, were triggered by outrage at the manner in which the 
former President was arrested.  They, too, challenged the legitimacy of the 
Arroyo Administration and sought the restoration of Estrada to power.  
Politicians may have twisted the demonstrations or whipped up the 
participants into a frenzy but these are irrelevant.  The demonstrations were 
still a declaration of allegiance for Estrada, and a challenge to the legitimacy 
of the present administration. 
All the other pocket versions of people power, however, still lack the 
moral outrage that correctly triggers people power.  They seem to be 
designed to block efforts at reforms that would put their jobs at stake or 
disingenuous attempts to invoke people power for narrow political ends. 
Other recent developments in the Philippines support the view that 
people power is a “pledge of allegiance” in favor of a particular leader.  
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ran for reelection in the national 
elections of May 2004.115  The opposition coalition fielded former movie 
actor Fernando Poe, Jr. as its candidate.  Poe built his career on a string of 
action movies that generated legions of fans.  But while his popularity is 
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incontestable, his citizenship was not.  Born of Spanish and American 
parents, there was some question whether Poe satisfied the citizenship 
requirement of the Philippine presidency.116  Petitions for the 
disqualification of Poe were filed with the Commission on Elections and the 
issue ultimately reached the Philippine Supreme Court.117  Throughout these 
unsuccessful efforts, Poe’s supporters warned “they would take to the 
streets” if the candidate was disqualified by the Commission on Elections118 
and even warned of “a potential revolt.”119  Former President Estrada, a 
friend of Poe, warned the Supreme Court not to disqualify Poe:  “I’m 
warning them not to do that, lest there will be civil war, revolution or 
massive civil disobedience . . . .”120   
Poe’s supporters made a declaration of allegiance and a threat of 
collective action, regardless of whether he was qualified to run for President.  
These warnings are interesting because they verify the view that people 
power is not about democracy.  These statements are an affirmation of the 
view that, beyond formal legal and democratic institutions of the Philippine 
State, there are forces that can be summoned to support a preferred leader.   
These calls for people power are taken seriously.  Weeks after the 
election when the results were not yet officially determined, President 
Arroyo congratulated the Filipinos for successfully exercising their right to 
vote in a relatively peaceful and seemingly credible election.  In her first 
public appearance after the elections, she said, “We started this journey 
when we brought back democracy to our people through the power of the 
ballot and no longer in the streets.”121 
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President Arroyo’s statement was less about praising the Filipinos for 
conducting elections peacefully, and more of a plea to refrain from 
subjecting her tenuous mandate to the more exacting standards of people 
power.  To be sure, however, Arroyo’s supporters are also threatening to 
unseat Poe through massive protests if he is declared the winner.122  This 
pledge of allegiance is evidently made on both sides of the election trail.  
C. Implications for Research 
Looking at people power as a democratic revolution123 denies the 
reality that it is merely a short-lived and shortsighted outburst of rage.  
Revolutions are guided by the idea of an alternative regime to replace the 
existing one.  Revolutions follow a plan; people power does not do more 
than call for a resignation of a public official.  The uprising against Marcos 
sought to honor the results of an election, not initiate fundamental social 
change.  It was a largely urban and middle-class event that could qualify as a 
nonviolent revolt or nonviolent coup at best.124  Many observers and scholars 
assumed that overthrowing the Marcos regime would lead to the 
consolidation of democracy and were disappointed that it did not.  We 
magnify our disappointment by ascribing authorship of these events to 
divine intervention. 
The alternatives presented here should steer scholarship in another 
direction.  The Philippines has been in the process of democratization for 
more than a century,125 and the fall of Marcos is a single episode in that 
history.  Marcos’ departure from the presidential palace returned the 
Philippines to 1972, when it was in the grip of elite democracy.126  While the 
removal of the dictator was a significant gain in struggle towards 
democratization, it did not necessarily lead to a transition to democracy.  In 
fact, others charge, it restored elite democracy.127   
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Today, government is becoming even less representative of the 
people.  A member of the post-Marcos Congress is typically male, middle-
aged, and college-educated.  He is likely to have held local government 
office, and had a sibling, father, or grandfather who has also held public 
office.128  He has multiple sources of income and a net worth, estimated 
conservatively, of 10 million pesos.129 He is hardly representative of the 
typical Filipino.  
To insist on framing people power as a democratic revolution can 
only lead to complaints about its failure to consolidate democracy in the 
Philippines.  If we resist the temptation of locking people power onto 
democratization, then we can begin to look at it from other perspectives.  For 
instance, we could demonstrate, as others have, that the failure of democratic 
consolidation is attributable in part to the reconsolidation of elite control,130 
or to other factors such as male chauvinism.131   
The fall of Marcos could also be viewed as a form of non-violent 
action.  It involves “activity in the collective pursuit of social or political 
objectives and does not involve physical force or the threat of physical force 
against human beings.”132  Schock explains that: 
Nonviolent action occurs through: (1) acts of omission, 
whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, 
custom, law, or decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people 
perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not 
expected by norms or customs to perform, or are forbidden by 
law, regulation, or decree to perform; or (3) a combination of 
acts of omission and commission.133 
The removals of Marcos and Estrada and the attempted removal of 
Arroyo fall neatly into these definitions.  While people power can be 
understood as a species of nonviolent action, it is not necessarily a 
democratic revolution.   
Incarnations of people power are nonviolent acts.  This is clearly true 
for the removal of Marcos and Estrada.  The protest against Estrada’s arrest 
and the agitation for his return to power was also a nonviolent protest; it, 
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too, was people power in that it was a manifestation of allegiance to Estrada, 
at least until the crowds marched to the presidential palace.  These acts 
deserve study not necessarily as a strategy for democratization, but as 
instances of a form of nonviolent protest—triggered by outrage and directed 
specifically at the removal of an official.   
We could also ask if people power is a form of popular 
constitutionalism.  Although vaguely defined,134 removing public officials 
through massive protests could be what Tushnet referred to as “a law 
oriented to realizing the principles of the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution’s preamble.”135  In both successful attempts at removing 
their presidents, Filipinos could simply have been implementing the 
principles that are embedded in their Constitution as they understood it. 136 
As Kramer suggests, popular constitutionalism “assign[s] ordinary 
citizens a central and pivotal role in implementing their Constitution” and 
vests the “final interpretative authority . . . with the people themselves.”137  
On this view, popular constitutionalism allows citizens and political leaders 
to assert their interpretations of the Constitution on serious constitutional 
issues.  When there are no major controversies facing society, citizens and 
political leaders are content to let the Supreme Court’s rulings go 
unchallenged.  However, whenever circumstances compel Americans to 
crystallize their latent beliefs and choose sides, they consistently choose 
popular constitutionalism over the view that the Constitution is subject to 
authoritative control by the judiciary.138   
Is this not what Filipinos do when they intervene in the political 
processes?  Is it possible that people power is the Filipinos’ way of declaring 
what the law should be on a particular political issue?  Is it the people’s 
attempt at interpreting the Constitution? 
These alternative approaches should caution us against judging the 
Filipinos’ penchant for replacing their leaders as nothing more than mob 
rule.  Criticisms against “extra-constitutional” methods of removing public 
officials in the Philippines are misplaced because nonviolent demonstrations 
are not alien to democracies or to constitutionalism. Indeed, they are 
guaranteed by the Constitution.139  Public officers may be called on to 
account for their actions or to resign.  That public officials actually leave 
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office cannot make popular pressure for their resignation undemocratic.  
These popular uprisings are, at their core, a reflection of adherence to 
democratic principles.  We should look at people power not as a gauge of the 
political immaturity of Filipinos but as an indication of their willingness to 
reiterate the values that are enshrined in their Constitution.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the 2004 presidential elections, the incumbent President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo defeated the popular movie star Fernando Poe, Jr., by a 
little more than a million votes.140  In her inaugural address, the President 
found it necessary to refer to the potential threat of another popular uprising.  
She hoped that: 
The divisive issues generated by EDSA [I], [II,] and [III] will 
also be just memories shared by friends from every side in 
those upheavals.  Only the lessons of unity, courage and a just 
closure kept alive in their hearts.  
  We must end with justice the conflict brought about by 
EDSA [I], [II] and [III].  There are more things that bind rather 
than tear us apart as a nation.  We are a vibrant country with a 
lively democracy and fervor burning in our hearts.  Industry, 
patience, fear of God and love for family are common values 
we hold dear.141  
Arroyo is evidently hoping to extinguish the phenomenon that helped put her 
in power three years earlier.   
The views on Philippine people power phenomenon have changed 
over the years; it is scarcely remembered as part of the wave of 
democratization that swept across the world.  Instead, recent versions of the 
phenomenon have prompted observers to become wary of the way it can be 
used to by-pass constitutional rules on succession.  This caution raises 
questions in turn on the legitimacy of governments that assume power 
through people power.  It invites instability today where it used to inspire 
hope.   
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This article attempts to redirect the discussion on people power by re-
imagining the phenomenon as distinct from democratic revolution.  It cannot 
be considered as a revolution because it preserves so much of the old order 
that it is unable to initiate and sustain structural or policy changes.  This 
failure to produce change is the reason that Filipinos lament the restoration 
of the pre-Marcos forces to power so quickly after the dictator was 
dramatically deposed.   
Instead, people power should be seen as an expression of outrage and 
not a blueprint for structural change.  It is an objection against an act by 
representatives of the State or a declaration of allegiance in favor of a 
particular person.  The force by which this objection is made is so powerful 
that it dislodged a dictatorship and an incompetent administration. 
To view people power as a catalyst for democratization can only lead 
to disappointment when the substance of Philippine democracy is assessed.  
Instead, students of this phenomenon should view it either as a significant 
step towards democratization, or as a form of protest that has little to do with 
democratization.  Either way, we may now ask the right questions about the 
state of democratization in the Philippines instead of bemoaning the 
Filipinos’ proclivities toward extra-constitutional remedies. 
VII. EPILOGUE:  THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE? 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo beat movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. in the 
presidential elections on May 10, 2004, in part because of the opposition’s 
failure to unite under a single candidate.  The official tally showed that 
Arroyo won 40% of the vote with Poe following closely with 36.5%.142 
The opposition contested the official results of the elections.  In 
separate petitions, Poe and his vice-presidential candidate, Loren Leagarda, 
filed election protests with the Supreme Court (which sits as a Presidential 
Electoral Tribunal) to annul Congress’ proclamation of President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo and Vice President Noli de Castro as the winners of the 
elections.143  Months later, however, Poe lapsed into a coma144 and died 
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shortly thereafter.145  The Supreme Court later dismissed Poe’s electoral 
protest.146 
Despite his death, Poe’s supporters said that they would “do anything 
to unseat President Arroyo, including waging another people power on 
EDSA.”147  Poe’s supporters said they would entrust the next administration 
to Poe’s widow, Susan Roces.  They said that they would not wait until 2010 
when Arroyo’s six-year term ends, adding that, “There is no other way to 
replace Mrs. Arroyo but people power.  The Constitution does not allow the 
holding of snap election[s].”148 
These statements stress two important points.  First, people power is 
always an option that can be exercised in Philippine politics against 
incumbent officials.  Second, Poe’s supporters acknowledge the existence of 
the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, but may employ mass protests 
to oust the incumbent President.   
The irony is inescapable.  Careful not to offend the Constitution by 
insisting on an unscheduled election, Arroyo’s detractors say they will push 
her out the door instead.  Despite criticisms of the use of people power, 
Filipinos have evidently managed to reconcile it with the idea of 
constitutionalism. 
Things, however, have been taking a turn for the worse for the 
President.  Arroyo is already the Philippines’ most unpopular president in 
the post-Marcos era.  Her satisfaction ratings plummeted to minus fourteen 
in March 2003, after she decided to join the US war in Iraq.  Her ratings 
were at minus twelve in March 2005, because of rising inflation and 
economic difficulties.149  In May 2005 Arroyo’s performance rating fell to 
its lowest ever, to minus thirty-three.150  Even Joseph Estrada enjoyed a plus 
nine rating at the height of his impeachment proceeding in December 
2000.151   
To make matters worse, a congressional investigation on illegal 
gambling produced witnesses implicating members of Arroyo’s family.  
Thereafter, recordings of phone conversations between the President and 
Commissioner Virgilio Garcilliano of the Commission on Elections during 
the height of the 2004 presidential elections triggered calls for her 
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resignation.152  There are three hours of taped conversations that suggest 
attempts on the part of the President to manipulate the results of the 
elections.153  
The President’s response to the crisis was disappointing.  She initially 
refused to comment on the tape.  She then delivered a message on television 
admitting that it was her voice on the tape, and apologized for what she 
called “a lapse of judgment.”154  She hoped that her apology would stop the 
increasing calls for her resignation.155  Refusing to acknowledge any 
wrongdoing on her part, Arroyo blamed everyone else for the present crisis.  
She blamed members of her family and sent them away.156  She blamed her 
cabinet and asked its members to resign.157  She blamed the political system 
and called for the revision of the Constitution and a shift to a parliamentary 
and federal form of government.158  
Survey after survey shows the President’s eroding support.  A large 
majority of Filipinos, according to one survey, believe that the Philippines 
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would be better off without Arroyo at the helm of government.159  The 
majority of Metro Manila residents prefer an impeachment to the President’s 
resignation.160  Nearly eight out of ten Filipinos want the President out of 
office even before she completes her six-year term, whether by resignation, 
impeachment, or unconstitutional means.161  Arroyo was rated the worst of 
the five presidents the Philippines has had since the administration of her 
father, President Diosdado Macapagal.162 
Arroyo, like Marcos, is perpetuating herself in power with a dubious 
electoral mandate.  Her administration, like Estrada’s, had also been racked 
by scandal and charges of corruption. By debasing the popular will and 
desecrating good governance, President Arroyo has made herself a prime 
candidate for removal through another popular uprising.  If people power is 
about the restoration of democracy and a call to public accountability, then 
there should be sufficient reason for another uprising.  Yet there is no 
outrage.   
Instead, Filipinos appear to be split down the middle and are 
displaying, instead of indignation, indecisiveness.  Former President Aquino 
has asked Arroyo to resign163 while former President Fidel V. Ramos, is 
standing by (sometimes literally) the embattled President.164  The Protestant 
Church favors resignation,165 but the Catholic Church does not.166  Business 
groups167 and the country’s schools are also divided.168  Political parties 
allied with the President are experiencing internal rifts.169  A faction of the 
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President’s cabinet resigned.170  Arroyo’s supporters are staging their own 
demonstrations to oppose her removal from office.171  
The present crisis is still stewing but several views have surfaced in an 
attempt to explain the Filipinos’ sudden reluctance to take to the streets.  
First, there may be genuine disagreement as to whether President Arroyo 
actually committed any offense when she spoke to the election 
commissioner.  Some sectors of society probably require a direct command 
from the President to election officials to commit fraud before they take to 
the streets.  A mere conversation with an election officer, in this view, is not 
sufficient.  
Second, commentators have suggested that Filipinos are suffering 
from “People Power fatigue” and will not mount a revolt against the 
government, especially without support from a more professional and non-
politicized military.172  Analysts are claiming that Filipinos have grown tired 
of taking to the streets to sack their leaders only to discover that their 
problems go beyond individual personalities.173  Still others explain that this 
“fatigue” is actually the peoples’ refusal to be used in the latest round of 
intra-elite wars.174  Another uprising, from this point of view, would be a 
waste of time since people power has not brought about genuine changes in 
Philippine politics.  
A third view is that Vice President Noli de Castro is not yet ready to 
assume the presidency and that he will merely perpetuate elite politics.175  
He is regarded as “a political novice, a former radio broadcaster who once 
served a lackluster Senate term and is perceived as an intellectual 
lightweight.”176  Some sectors have identified de Castro as the only 
impediment to another people power revolt.177  Perhaps, consistently with 
my arguments here, there is no uprising because there is no one for the 
people to shift allegiance to. 
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Fourth, it is possible that Filipinos are simply allowing their 
institutions to work.  Rather than marching in the streets to demand the 
president’s resignation, they would like to see the removal done through an 
impeachment trial.   
Finally, the Filipinos’ inaction may be explained as a function of the 
role of class.  It has been suggested that the middle class and business 
community supported Arroyo’s victory and paid little attention to charges of 
fraud, reasoning that her margin of victory “was significant enough, even 
discounting the margin of fraud.”178 
Now that The Tapes have shaken the boat, they are in a real dilemma.  
Accustomed in [EDSA I] and [EDSA II] to taking the high ground and 
marching in the streets against discredited presidents, they are now the ones 
calling for calm and sobriety.  In 1986 and 2001, they advocated “people 
power” over constitutional and legal processes, but today are the ones 
arguing for stability and “the rule of law.”179 
The middle class is standing by its choice and making every excuse 
for the President.  The Catholic Church, quick to condemn Estrada for his 
sins, was even quicker in demanding his resignation.  In contrast, its 
response to the present crisis is markedly conservative. The Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines issued a statement where it invoked 
the Constitution as the anchor for the resolution of the present crisis: 
Our political leaders have to be the first to observe and 
faithfully implement the Constitution.  Revolving the crisis has 
to be within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of 
the land so as to avoid social chaos, the further weakening of 
political systems, and greater harm in the future.180  
This is astonishing considering that the Catholic Church helped spark the 
removal of Messrs Marcos and Estrada.  It is most likely that if the tapes had 
caught Joseph Estrada conversing with election officials, the Church would 
call for his immediate resignation and that there would be less divisions in 
the various sectors of society.   
Perhaps the Filipinos’ sudden display of docility can be explained by 
any one or a combination of all these factors.  In any case, these recent 
events suggest that people power is not a simple burst of outrage.  I am 
inclined to believe that it is a calculated response to a political crisis insofar 
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as it actually considers its potential consequences, particularly to one’s class 
interests.  In other words, the potential consequence of Arroyo’s removal, 
particularly to middle and upper class interests is tempering the public 
display of people’s allegiance.  The absence of a suitable replacement for the 
President has checked popular outrage—to the President’s relief.181 
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